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Abstract 
In the present attempt there is an analysis in credence goods market. I assume that 
there is an upstream monopolist and two downstream firms. Consumers know that 
quality ranges but they do not know which of the firms supplies each quality. At first, 
there can be monopoly or duopoly in the downstream level. This depends on the 
efficiency of each firm and consumers’ trust. Secondly, the introduction of a label can 
correct the lack of full information, but it can also decrease the profitability of the 
firms. Lastly, the upstream monopolist may have greater profits so as to encourage a 
monopoly in downwards market.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Introduction 
 
Consumers used to buy products basing on their price and as a result they 
formed the demand function. In the meanwhile suppliers kept the same point of view, 
the one of price and in that way the equilibrium set. Nowadays budget constraint is 
not the only one of the factors for consumers’ evaluation to goods, but more and more 
people are getting aware of the origin of the purchased goods. This worry about 
quality is especially focused on food, because it can cause irreversible consequences 
to health. Therefore, not only price is an important fact in making decisions, but 
quality as well. This happens because it is getting harder and harder to investigate the 
quality of goods. Consumers are in search of a better informational system revealing 
their inability of safe food verification and their necessity for healthy nutrition. One 
way restoring information is experience from everyday life and search that can 
minimize the amount of hazardous goods. Trusting retailers or consulting experts can 
be another way for grading products. However, we should take into consideration that 
understanding quality is difficult because of technological improvement. As a matter 
of fact, during last decades fertilizers and several other techniques have made the 
restoration of information difficult using the traditional techniques. 
Firstly, Nelson1 (1970) and Darby and Karni (1973) analyzed separately each 
good according to its characteristics2. Later, there was further classification of 
products in three main categories: search, experience and credence goods: 
 
Search characteristics:  The quality can be ascertained by consumers 
before purchase 
Experience characteristics:  The quality is learned after the good is bought. 
In this case information that has been acquired 
by the buyer can be used in repeated purchases. 
Credence characteristics:  The quality is seldom clear even though 
consumption has been done. In this part 
                                                          
1
 Nelson hypothecates that there is more consumers’ speculation about purchasing experience 
commodities than search ones. An empirical research confirms this thesis by Ford, Smith and Swasy in 
1990. Darby and Karni expand this statement by focusing on the convenience with which people buy 
experience goods instead of credence products. Steenkamp examines this view in 1990. 
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consumer should trust a third party’s 
certification or seller’s credibility. 
 
Owing the latter definition in Darby and Karni and Nelson according to Jean 
Tirole3, credence goods are referred as “those which, although worthwhile, cannot be 
evaluated in normal use” because “they are expensive to judge even after purchase”. 
They seemed to use the term “credence goods” instead of goods with credence 
characteristics. After all, consumers buy goods and not characteristics and the quality 
of goods is a bundle of the quality of these different characteristics. As it is difficult to 
analyze all the characteristics together, we focus on the one that we are interested in 
every case. 
A simple example may help the reader to understand better the differences 
between the three categories. Assuming the product is a fruit then a search 
characteristic will be a squash or strange spots on its surface. An experience 
characteristic will be bitterness or “rubber” taste and a credence characteristic will be 
its production system to avoid genetically modified seeds. 
However, the greatest the analysis the more problems rise. Since every good 
can be classified in all or almost all categories scientists face the problem of 
aggregation when they attempt to have an empirical analysis. Moreover, every 
product has innumerous characteristics and as a result time after time a different one 
may be more important than the others. For instance, somebody may bring in mind 
how important the place and the soil were that vegetables and fruit grew up when 
there was the explosion of the nuclear factory in Chernobyl (Ukraine) on the 26th of 
April 1986.  For this reason, we refer to goods as credence goods when we focus on 
this kind of characteristics.  
At present, technological development makes the investigation even harder. 
To clarify this we can bring in mind what Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) is 
called. Using GMO goods become more long-lived on the one hand, but they can 
cause implications in humans’ health as well. The consequences of GMO could be 
even worse especially if the goods are related to nutrition. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2
 The characteristics approach (Lancaster 1966) supports that “a good can be described as a bundle of 
characteristics: quality, location, time, availability, consumers’ information and so on”(Tirole. J., p.96 
chapter 2, 1988) 
3
 Tirole, J., p.106 chapter 2, (1988) 
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Another significant problem is that reputation cannot reveal the quality of 
credence good. Furthermore, purchasing, searching or signaling is not an effective 
way to achieve perfect information and provide the ability to consumers to be 
conscious about their goods. This means that reputation cannot be built and 
uncertainty exists between producers and consumers. In this point Dullek, 
Kerschbamer and Sutter (2009) got through a research that confirmed the above 
belief. They also found out that liability and competition among sellers is the most 
important factor in order trade to be further developed and reputation just follows. 
The outcome is that if asymmetric information is not corrected, then the result 
will be a pooling equilibrium or otherwise a “lemons’ problem”4 would arise. This 
means that consumers have total ignorance about the goods that contain or not 
genetically modified organisms and therefore total ignorance about the danger. Thus, 
credibility to food is not enough and it is necessary some measures to be put into 
effect.  
As a consequence there has been a lot of discussion about the solution of this 
problem. Scientists have had to answer a lot of questions about the appropriate 
measures that should have been or be taken. Firstly, the kind of certification is the 
greatest point. Somebody must choose between grading, minimum quality standards 
or labeling. Should there be a scale in the number of GMOs, a minimum level or a 
reference of containing? And if there is a label, ought it to be discrete or continuous? 
Moreover, there is speculation on whether a government can impose the obligation of 
it or if voluntary label is better. If so, should government be responsible for or can 
private firms provide equal or better services for social welfare? All the mentioned 
questions including the special cases of market structure (perfect competition, 
monopoly, oligopoly, asymmetric firms), consumers’ preferences and participants’ 
distribution set the scene for the literature about credence goods. As a result, the 
process seems like a domino game once a question is answered, a new one arises.  
To begin with, several suggestions about the appropriate certificate for GM 
products such as labeling, Minimum Quality Standards (MQS)5 and grading have 
been made. In the first case a label with containing or not is preferred, while in MQS 
a minimum level is imposed. Lastly, grading scales the goods according to GMO per 
                                                          
4
 Akerlof, G. A, (1970) 
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ingredient. Lapan and Moschini (2007) showed that a tight standard may lead to 
welfare loss, a label is more preferable for the firms and MQS may be misplaced if 
they are set by firms. Marette (2008) follows the same path and mentions that a 
standard imposed is quite differentiated by a label which can be set by the firm 
although it prefers without regulation. Specifically, the existence of a safety standard 
can cause the absence of a label or the appearance of it due to the circumstances. 
After choosing the type of quality standard - in our case it is the label – we have to 
decide the characteristics of the label.  
Secondly, social planner confronts a very important and basic problem. She 
should define whether the label is voluntary or obligatory. On the one hand consumers 
generally desire further information. On the other hand producers would initially 
avoid the label and the cost of it. In case of credence goods Segerson (1999) mentions 
that even if the quality of such products is not easily detectable direct government 
intervention through regulation is not imperative. The threat of mandatory labels in 
combination with financial support can be enough in order for firms to undertake the 
labeling process. On the contrary, Mitrokostas and Petrakis argues that while total 
profits without regulation are less than total profits under government interference, 
but since total welfare is increased, then sooner or later “firms’ endogenous choice is 
to engage in Corporate Social Responsibility”  (WP 2008). On the contrary, Fulton 
and Giannakas (2004) states that firms have a tendency in cheating, so government 
has to monitor the labeling process. Thereby, if firms decide to cheat, then appropriate 
regulation is imposed. 
Unexpectedly, the imposition of a label can come from another group. For 
instance, the high quality suppliers are definitely well off by the introduction of 
regulation. In fact according to Zago and Pick (2004) if firms have market power, 
then they can impose the label, although consumers may lose part of their welfare 
after a while. Therefore, government may not be the only one that aims at restoration 
of information. 
Apart from this perspective there are some other aspects for the obligation of a 
label or not and they have no connection with government. Renck (2003) and Latvala 
and Kola (2003) converges in the same point and supports that labeling details can 
                                                                                                                                                                      
5
 Instead of a label it can also set a MQS which does not give full information about the product but at 
least it restores somehow the informational asymmetry. Some papers referred to the subject are Garella 
and Petrakis (2007), Bonroy,O and Constantatos, C. (2004) and many others. 
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form a positive or a negative decision making in purchasing. Fulton and Giannakas 
(2004) believes that other important factors such as consumer’s aversion, market 
power, marketing costs and last but not least the political power of each pressure 
group can enforce the obligatory label entry. 
Another significant query is about the discretion or the continuity of the label. 
The choice out of two can lead to completely different results. When the label is 
continuous and voluntary, then it can cause no distortions. Contrarily, Roe and 
Sheldon (2007) argues that discretion can lead to problems such as the expulsion of 
good quality out of market. This statement was defined earlier when they conclude 
that continuous label improves consumer’s surplus whereas binary is welfare 
improving for all groups assuming that the binary standard is higher than the one 
under continuous (Roe and Sheldon, 2001). 
Last but not least we should decide who is going to provide the label. 
Nowadays according to regulation either government or private institutions certify 
firms. As a result the state should clarify whether it would intrude in the process or 
not. Some countries or federations found institutions in order to correct the lack of full 
information. International Standard Organisation (with ISO 9000) is an example of a 
private middle institution whereas the agricultural department of a country can be the 
public certifier. European labels (European Economic Community, 1992) include 
Protect Designation of Origin (PDO), Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) and 
the “Certificate of Specific Character” which reveals processing methods and specific 
characteristics. However, with the MacSharry reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (1992), the European Union reconsidered its agricultural policies, focusing on 
non - distortionary policy interventions. Since then there is a discussion about the 
identity of the label certifier. According to Crespi and Marette (2003) this decision 
had better be taken after the government considers factors such as the nature of 
product, the effect of the label in the market, the cost undertaker. They also mentions 
that in case of public label there should be a per-unit or an ad valorem fee. 
Mitrokostas and Petrakis (WP 2008) mentions that origin of label clearly depends on 
whether there will be a profit or a welfare maximizing problem and concludes that the 
social planner’s approach is always preferable by society. In case of Baksi and Bose 
(2007) only when the ‘‘market share effect’’ greatly exceeds the ‘‘incentive-to-cheat 
effect’’, then label by a neutral part is the most preferable. Wolinsky (1993) claims 
that revelation can be achieved if there is competition in the market; therefore a 
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private institution is a better choice for the government. It is worthwhile mentioning 
that the label can be provided by the firm itself. Fulton and Giannakas (2004) states 
that an obligatory self – labeling sooner or later will lead to a mandatory label by a 
third party because firms have a natural tension in cheating and as a consequence 
government is obliged to establish a monitoring policy which is proved quite costly. 
However, present empirical studies6 show that consumers believe that a public label is 
more trustworthy than a private and can easily restore asymmetric information.  
Although the referred problems are the main, there are still many other queries 
that need an answer. For instance, if a label is chosen, which one is better: 
“Containing GMO or not containing?” Probably the answer lies on consumer’s 
behavior. Crespi and Marette (2003) supports the same opinion: “The label «Does 
Contain» will be selected by a welfare maximizing government if there are many 
consumers who are reluctant to purchase products containing GMOs, while label  
«Does not Contain» will be chosen if that ratio is small”. 
The problem of labeling seems more complicated if we mention other 
countries as well. Bureau, Marette and Schiavina (1998) refers to the entry of low 
quality goods in the domestic market and how inefficiencies can be avoided. Nimon 
and Beghin (1999) focuses on the textile market and the effect of ecological labels. 
Roe and Sheldon (2001) finds out that if integration and harmonization of label 
through countries achieve, then welfare gain will be multiplied. In the case of trade 
there is great concern about the regulation in every country and how exporters can 
face possible changes in demand. Hooker (1999) analyses how the food safety 
regulation can be a trade barrier. Sheldon (2002)  mentions that exporters may face 
the imposition of an obligatory label as a pre – entry approval.  
Except for the above techniques, there are many ways in the credence market 
for revealing the fraudulent firms. An outstanding approach is the one of Emons’ 
(2001). Emons claims that for unobservable or observable services and observable 
capacity is a sufficient condition for diagnosis instead of repair. However, he 
mentions that the kind of job is still important to find equilibrium. He also adds that 
prices in combination with capacity can be revealing (2005). Another prospect is 
advertisement. Mitrokostas and Petrakis support that advertising can give further 
information about the product but it can cause imbalance in the total welfare, whereas 
                                                          
6
 Latvala, T. and Kola, J. , (2003) 
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Liu (2006) proved that the market structure can help in the solution. Specifically, 
when the conscientious producers are more than the fraudulent ones, then this can 
reduce social welfare and efficiency.  
All in all the general idea is that a label constitutes a reason to restore full 
information (sometimes even if it is not set into action and the threat is quite credible) 
and the aim of the present attempt is to contribute in this quest.  
In this work market structure and efficiency is taken into account in a credence 
commodity market. The idea of the model sets its roots in the work of Bonroy and 
Constantatos (2003 and 2008) and Gabszewicz and Grilo (1992). The main difference 
with the last ones (Gabszewicz and Grilo, 1992) is the assumption of direct 
connection of high quality with high marginal cost and as a consequence the efficient 
supplier is the one with the bigger net surplus. In the present attempt there are two 
duopoly retailers and one upstream monopolist. The upper producer has an global 
view of the process and offers both the bad and the good quality. Consumers are 
homogeneous but there is a variance in their beliefs about the credibility of which is 
the high quality firm. Probability higher to ½ implies consumers’ trustworthiness to 
this firm.  
Eventually it appears to be a tendency of the low quality firm to avoid the 
installation of a regulatory mechanism. Its profits descend by the time that an 
introduction of a label has been done. On the contrary, the retailer with the good 
quality is interested in adopting a quality regulation since her profitability rises in this 
way. What is more interesting is that the upwards monopolist is indifferent whether 
there would be a dominancy of one or another firm without a label or efficiency with 
a label. Under some constraints the mentioned possibilities are more desirable than 
duopoly. 
 The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and the 
analysis of the equilibrium prices. In Section 3 the imposition of a label is examined, 
whereas in last section some concluding remarks are providing. 
 
 
 
The model 
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In the model there are three levels of participants: consumers, downstream 
retailers and upstream monopolist. Monopolist supplies to retailers and retailers 
provide to consumers. Additionally, in the market two different types of products can 
be found, the high quality (type 2) and the low quality (type 1). Each of the retailers 
exclusively sells the one or the other quality. It is assumed that the high quality 
requires greater cost to be produced, so as c1<c2 and that utility is higher than zero 
(Uj>0 , j=1,2) in any case. Moreover, since that the high quality is the second one, it is 
definitely clear that U2> U1. Another hypothesis is that all consumers have the same 
preferences given by the function  
 V=Uj – pj  ∀V>0 
where pj is the price for every quality. If none good is purchased, then V=0.  
In case that both goods are offered at the same price, good 2 is chosen. If both 
products are with different prices at market, then using the ratio 
2 1
r
c c
∆
=
−
 for 
2 1U U∆ = −  we can define that whether r>1, the product with the high quality is 
preferred and vice versa. Hereon, for r>1 the high quality and supplier 2 are the 
efficient ones.  
Furthermore, consumer knows the existence of two qualities, the product 
characteristics, but she cannot realize which firm sells the high quality7. She is 
assumed to be characterized by a probability α ∈[0, 1], which implies that when a  is 
low, consumer is closer to the truth. Thereby, when probability tends to 1 then the 
final user believes that firm 1 sells the high quality product and the firm 2 the low 
one, which is completely misleading. Therefore, when α >
2
1
, then consumer strongly 
believe that the firm 1 is the one that supplies the high quality and vice versa if α <
2
1
. 
Another hypothesis is that there is a set of probabilities for consumer’s distribution S= 
[ a , a ], which are known to firms but unknown to final customers and their range is 
0≤ a ≤ a ≤1. As a result the expected utility for every consumer will be  
 
 αUi + (1-α) Uj - p j    (for j=1,2) 
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If we suppose that the prices are the same and the market is covered, then 
there is a consumer who will be indifferent whether to buy the one or the other good 
and whose belief is  
na = ∆
−
−
22
1 12 pp
 
There is also a possibility of a market gap, which means that some of the 
consumers will not be attracted by any of the retailers. By bringing Hotelling model in 
mind this case implies an unexploited market share somewhere between the two 
goods. There will consequently be two indifferent clients: the one will be between 
buying good 1 or nothing and the other between buying good 2 or nothing.  
 
1 1
1
p U
a
−
=
∆
  
 
2 2
2
U p
a
−
=
∆
  
Hence, with the appropriate manipulation it can be found out that the gap that 
appears in the market ends up to be more profitable for the high quality supplier. 
Profits of downstream and upstream are 
 
( )
( )
2
1
1 16
u
U
a a
α
π
∆ +
=
− ∆
  
 
( )
( )
2
2
2 16
u a U
a a
π
− ∆ +
=
− ∆
  
 
( ) ( )
( )
2 2
1 2
8
u
m
a U a U
a a
π
∆ + + − ∆ +
=
− ∆
  
In case of 1aα + < and when the market is uncovered then firm 2 is benefited 
more than firm 1. 
Proof:  
( ) ( )
1 2
2 2
1 2
1
u u
U a U
a
π π
α
α
< ⇔
∆ + < − ∆ + ⇔
+ <
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7
 The uncertainty will lead consumers to decide according to their beliefs. Probabilities will form the 
results 
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Where 1 0Uα∆ + > and 2 0a U− ∆ + > are two of the assumptions for the positive c1 
and c2. The 1aα + < reveals consumers’ beliefs which are closer to the truth or at 
least they are closer to the truth about the quality of one of the goods. 
Further analysis needs the covered market case where there is a more 
perplexing connection between all levels and all firms. In equilibrium market can be 
dominated by one of the two firms depending which one is the efficient or otherwise 
there is a duopoly. Therefore, the demand is 1 max{ ,0}m
a aD
a a
−
=
−
 and 
2 max{ ,0}m
a aD
a a
−
=
−
. If αm ∉ S , then sales of the one firm disappear and the other 
rules all. The dominant firm sets price above marginal cost in order not to incur loss 
and so as to eliminate its competitor’s profits. Moreover, full information restores the 
dominance of the efficient downstream supplier whereas incomplete information 
preserves consumers’ beliefs. As a matter of fact if 1 1(1 )
2
a
r
< − , then firm 2 is the 
dominant firm and if  1 1(1 )
2
a
r
> − then firm 1 master the whole demand for this good. 
The mastership of one retailer is not necessarily more preferable in equilibrium than 
duopoly. Moreover, a necessary and sufficient condition for this is that  1 0D >  , 
which means that it should be ( )1 1 11
2 2
a a f a
r
  > + − ≡  
  
 and  
( )1 12 1
2
a a g a
r
 > − + ≡ 
 
.  
Therefore, if the low quality is the efficient one, then r ∈ [0, 1] and firm 1 
possesses a monopolistic market share and firm 2 is expelled by the market or may 
have a limited clientele. In this occasion the low quality firm may even charge higher 
price just to have access to consumers with the lower elasticity. On the other hand, 
when high quality is the efficient, which follows the r ∈ [1, ∞], there is a chance that 
firm 2 may or may not be dominant even if its quality has been revealed.  
Taking into account the upstream monopolist we can easily discover that her 
profits alter according to the changes that are done to the downwards level. Providing 
that firm 1 is the dominant then its profits are defined to 1 1
d
m cπ = . Otherwise in case 
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that firm 2 is dominant then the profits are going to be 2 2
d
m cπ = . If we compare the 
two options, then the incentive for the upstream supplier will be greater to support a 
dominance of the second firm since 2 1c c> , which has been stated by the very 
beginning. This could cause a distortion in the market if the upper monopolist could 
choose her clients. However, there is also a possibility that the downstream firms 
would compete under oligopolistic terms and they reveal a different image of the 
market. 
Considering that rivalrous conditions are set, then duopolists share profits 
from a two stage game by using backwards induction. Under these conditions market 
share is differentiated. What is really interesting is the fact that despite the downwards 
duopoly, there is an upwards monopoly. This implies that the upstream supplier is the 
same and for this reason there may be a distorting impact in the market.  
Thus, the market structure in combination with the kind of the two demand 
functions raises queries. Specifically, the maximization of the monopolist profit 
function leads to two mirror images equations. In this point another equation should 
be taken into account. The first order conditions of profit optimization are not enough. 
The firm considers that the indifferent consumer should not only equalize the 
expected utility between the two products but also should not have net surplus, which 
implies that ( ) 0nEU a = . The results lead to  
1 2
1 1 2( 2 )( 12 6(1 2 2 ) )
12
a a
c U a a
a a
+ −
= − + − + − ∆
−
   
and 
2 2
1 1 2(4 12 6(1 2 2 ) )
12
a
c U a a
a a
−
= + + − + − ∆
−
 
And they stand if and only if 2a a> .Since c1 and c2 are set then the results for 
the other equation can be easily defined. 
 
2
1 2
2
2
1 ( 1 ( 2 36 30 ) 12
36( )
12 (4 36 30 ))
p U
U
α α
α α
α α
= − + − + − ∆ + ∆ −
−
∆ + − + ∆
  
 
 
2
2 2
2
2
1 ( 1 (2 36 6 ) 12
36( )
12 ( 4 36 6 ))
p U
U
α α
α α
α α
= − + + − ∆ − ∆ +
−
∆ + − − + ∆
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2 2
1
1 (1 24 12 (6 4)
36
(2 6(1 6 ) ))
D a α α
α α
= ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − +
− + ∆
   
 
 2
1 (1 2 4 )( 1 6 6 )
36
D α α α α= ∆ + − − + ∆ − ∆    
 
 
2 2
1
2
(1 24 12 ( 4 6 )
648( )
(2 6(1 6 ) ))
π α α α
α α
α α
∆
= + ∆ + ∆ + − + ∆ +
−
− + ∆
  
 
 
2 2
2 (1 2 4 ) (1 6 6 )648( )π α α α αα α
∆
= + − − ∆ + ∆
−
   
 
 
2
2 2
2 3 2
2
( (1 2 4 )
216( )
6( )(1 2 5 2 4
36( ) ) 108(1 2 2 )( ) )
m
U
π α α
α α
α α α α α αα α
α α α α α α
∆
= − + − +
−
− + − − + + +
− ∆ − + − − ∆
  
 
Moreover, there are some constraints that should be set for the existence of the 
above. These are mainly referred to the positive sign of p1 and p2 and the demand 
functions.  
 ( )11 1
31 1 10 1 ,
2 2
cp a a k a c
r
  ≥ ⇒ ≥ + − − ≡  ∆  
  
 
 ( )12 131 20 2 1 ,2
cp a a y a c
r
 ≥ ⇒ ≥ − + + ≡ ∆ 
  
 ( )1
1 1 10 1
2 2
D a a f a
r
  > ⇒ > + − ≡  
  
  
 ( )2
1 10 2 1
2
D a a g a
r
 > ⇒ > − + ≡ 
 
  
 2 2
U ∆>    
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The combination of ( )f a , ( )g a  and 45ο line is a way to define the area of a  
and a  in case of a duopoly or monopoly in retailers market. The intersection of the 
red and green line (the equation of ( )f a and ( )g a ) defines four different situations. 
The upper left part from the intersection is the case of a duopoly. The upper right part 
is when firm 2 is out of the market. The lower right part is when firm 2 is dominant 
and the lower left part is when there is no firm in the market. It is clear that the lower 
the r the wider the range of α  andα . When the r∈[0,1], the α  andα  take prices 
from almost 0 to 1(Figure 1). The efficiency of firm 1 can cause bigger uncertainty for 
consumers about the quality of each group, because the distribution of probabilities is 
greater. On the other hand, when firm 2 is the efficient, then the range of probabilities 
(so as duopoly to exist) is getting smaller (Figures 2, 3, 4). Specifically, for r =100 
(Figure 4) the S set has shrunk. The problem is that if the probability set is between 
the green and purple line (upper left polygon), then consumers are incorrect about the 
origin of each good. Moreover, between the red and the purple line there is duopoly 
and the consumers are getting closer to the truth.  
A possible comparison between duopoly and dominancy for the upstream 
monopolist will show that in case that   
( )( )( )1 12 1 2 4 6 1 4 2 02 2 4and a a
α
α α α α α α α> − + − + + − − ∆ > ⇔ > −  
then there is a greater tendency to support monopoly market. Otherwise, the profitable 
case can be proved avoidable and a competitive market can give the desired 
satisfaction. The upstream supplier will react in the same way if there is a label to be 
imposed. The reason is that the profits in this production level are the same in 
retailer’s dominancy and a full information case, in which result we will be leaded 
after the analysis of the downwards firms. 
 
 
 
Perfect Label 
 
A traditional approach would fulfill its target as soon as she would find the 
equilibrium point. Under these circumstances this seems quite inadequate. Consumers 
speculate about the quality of each product and the way of restoration of information. 
 16 
In this case a private or public institution takes charge of this process. The origin of 
such an organization is beyond the boarder of the present attempt. Taking it as granted 
the analysis focuses on the existence of a perfect label. A full information situation 
means that beliefs for high and low quality vanish, which means that 0α α= = . 
Besides, the label can be voluntary or mandatory. In fact, even if it is optional the 
high quality firm has always a motive to test its goods, so as to reveal its quality and 
cream consumers with a higher mark up.  
Consequently, the entry of a label resets the scene. The efficiency of each firm 
is an important element, which differentiates the prices and the profits given the last 
time. As a matter of fact the results are clear below. 
 
Efficient firm π1PL π2PL πmPL 
1 c2  – c1 - ∆  0 c1 
2 0 ∆ – (c2 – c1) c2 
 
In addition, a comparison between a non – label case and a label one can lead 
to interesting conclusions. Specifically, firm one has greater profits under dominance 
or duopoly without a label than with a label, which implies that a low quality firm has 
great incentives to avoid the introduction of a certifier. As a consequence this reaction 
more or less reveals the type of the retailer and the possibility of label entry can be 
fated for its survival. On the contrary, firm two has quite dissimilar outcomes. Hereon 
the high quality company clearly prefers the installation of a quality certification to 
the dominancy if it is the efficient one. This is a logical consequence respectively to 
the one of the previous retailer.  
Ascending to the production level the upstream monopolist reveals interesting 
results. Strange as it may seem she tastes the same profit under non – label monopoly 
and perfect label. This may show indifference in preference. Between dominancy 
without a label and imposition of it she bears the same fruits. However, there is a 
possible incentive for avoiding the label especially if there will be an extra fixed cost 
but this would need further investigation to be said in certainty. Considering that the 
follow constraints stand  
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( )( )( )1 12 1 2 4 6 1 4 2 02 2 4and a a
α
α α α α α α α> − + − + + − − ∆ > ⇔ > −  
which means that 12
2
α α> −  is a sufficient conditions then duopoly case leads to 
inferior profits than a case under full information and as a result she would understand 
that providing only with superior quality goods the market can be a quite gainful 
movement.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The existence of uncertainty in a good market reveals that consumers need 
additional information to form their purchasing decision. This would be easily done if 
it was not for credence goods market, where traditional reputation is out of effect. The 
interesting part arises when the introduction of a perfect label comes to restore the 
informational shortage. Then the scene is reset and different preferences become 
obvious.  
For the retailer of the low quality good this news is fateful. The reveal of her 
quality without considering the efficiency part is a fact that it will decrease the profits. 
This is true for duopoly or monopoly in the retailers’ market. As a result firm 1 is not 
satisfied by the introduction of a label. On the opposite site the high quality company 
faces with excitement a full informed market. The introduction of a label raises its 
profits in case of a duopoly. If the profits are compared to duopoly profits, then the 
result is ambiguous. 
The analysis of the upstream monopolist is quite surprising. She prefers 
equally firm 1 to be dominant or firm 1 to be efficient with a label. The same stands 
for firm 2. The interesting part is that if upstream monopolist can choose whether to 
supply on or the other firm, then there can be a distortion to the market, because her 
profits are higher when firm 2 dominates the market. The case of a duopoly can be 
more or less profitable according to the constraints. Finally, if the upwards monopolist 
supplies high quality good to the second firm then even the second would be highly 
benefited as long as she is the efficient one.  
 18 
If the low quality firm is efficient, consumers have a wider distribution in their 
beliefs. On the contrary, the efficiency of firm 2 gets smaller the probabilities’ set. 
Under some circumstances they can purchase goods and they can be aware of the 
quality or at least they can be closer to the truth. Consumers can approach real quality 
of each firm under duopoly or dominancy of firm 2. This is not difficult to happen if 
the upstream monopolists can decide to provide with goods both firms or just firm 2. 
Lastly, when a perfect label is imposed, there is informational restoration and 
probabilities of beliefs become zero. 
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Figure 1: For r=0.4 
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Figure 2: For r=1 
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Figure 3: For r=2 
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Figure 4: For r=100 
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APPENDIX 
 
 Without label 
 
 
UNCOVERED MARKET  
 
The consumer 1 is indifferent in buying the good 1 or not 
 
1 2 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 1
1 1
1
(1 ) 0
( )
a U a U p
a U U U p
p U
a
+ − − = ⇔
− + = ⇔
−
=
∆
 (1.1) 
 
Where  
 2 1U U∆ = −  (1.2) 
 
and the indifference between good 2 and non purchasing is  
 
2 1 2 2 2
2 2 2 1 2
2 2
2
(1 ) 0
( )
a U a U p
U a U U p
U p
a
+ − − = ⇔
+ − = ⇔
−
=
∆
 (1.3) 
 
Constraints in case of uncovered market 
 
If 
 
1
1 1 2 1
1 2 2 1
1
2 2
ma a
p U p p
p p U U
> ⇒
− −
> − ⇒
∆ ∆
+ > +
 (1.4) 
 
The same result arise if  
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2
2 2 2 1
1 2 2 1
1
2 2
ma a
U p p p
p p U U
< ⇒
− −
< − ⇒
∆ ∆
+ > +
 (1.5) 
 
In this case substituting (1.1) into the demand function for the low quality 
good this will be 
 
( )
1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
u
u
u
a aD
a a
p U
a
D
a a
a p UD
a a
−
= ⇔
−
−
−
∆= ⇔
−
∆ − +
=
− ∆
 (1.6) 
  
So  1 1 0U p a− + ∆ >  (1.7) 
Equally substituting (1.3) into the D2 
 
 
( )
2
2
2 1
2
2 2
2
u
u
u
a aD
a a
p U
a
D
a a
U p aD
a a
−
= ⇔
−
−
− −
∆= ⇔
−
− − ∆
=
− ∆
 (1.8) 
Since  
 2 2 0U p a− − ∆ >  (1.9) 
 
As a consequence profits will be for downstream retailers by using (1.6) and 
(1.8) 
 ( )
( )
1 1
1 1 1
u a p Up c
a a
π
 ∆ − + = −
 − ∆ 
 (1.10) 
and 
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 ( )
( )
2 2
2 2 2
u U p ap c
a a
π
 − − ∆ = −
 − ∆ 
 (1.11) 
 
Maximizing (1.10) and (1.11) we obtain   
 
1 1
1 2
u a U cp ∆ + +=  (1.12) 
and  
 
2 2
2 2
u a U cp − ∆ + +=  (1.13) 
 
Moreover it should be checked whether profit functions follow the property of 
convexity in pi  
 
( )
2
2
2 0
u
i
u
ip a a
π∂
= − <
∂ − ∆
 (1.14) 
for i=1,2 
Setting (1.12) and (1.13) into (1.6) and (1.8) it can easily be found that 
 
 
( )
1 1
1 2
u a U cD
a a
∆ + −
=
− ∆
 (1.15) 
and  
 
( )
2 2
2
u a U cD
a a
− ∆ + −
=
− ∆
 (1.16) 
 
Using these final demand functions the profits of the manufacturer will be 
 
( ) ( )
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
1 22 2
u
m
u
m
c D c D
a U c a U c
c c
a a a a
π
π
= + ⇒
   ∆ + − − ∆ + −
= +      − ∆ − ∆   
 
 
If it is differentiated with respect to c1 and c2 then  
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1
1 2
u a Uc ∆ +=  (1.17) 
and 
 
2
2 2
u a Uc − ∆ +=  (1.18) 
 
It is clear that   
 
( )
1
2 1
0
1 0
a U
aU a U
∆ − > ⇔
− − >
 (1.19) 
and 
 
( )
2
2 1
0
1 0
a U
a U aU
− ∆ + > ⇔
− + >
 (1.20) 
 
Furthermore, the second order conditions are important 
 
 
 
( )
2
2
2 0
u
m
ic a a
π∂
= − <
∂ − ∆
 (1.21) 
 for i=1,2 
 
Finally, the profits of the upstream and downstream firm will be 
 
( )
( )
2
1
1 16
u
U
a a
α
π
∆ +
=
− ∆
 (1.22) 
 
( )
( )
2
2
2 16
u a U
a a
π
− ∆ +
=
− ∆
 (1.23) 
 
( ) ( )
( )
2 2
1 2
8
u
m
a U a U
a a
π
∆ + + − ∆ +
=
− ∆
 (1.24) 
Comparing the π1u and π2u  
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 ( ) ( )
1 2
2 2
1 2
1 2
u u
U a U
U U
π π
α
< ⇔
∆ + < − ∆ + ⇔
<
 (1.25) 
 
 
 
COVERED MARKET  
 
In this case the indifferent consumer is the one who shows the same 
preference between buying the good 1 or 2 which means that 
 
( )
( ) 212212
1121
1
1
EUEU
pUaaUEU
pUaaUEU
=⇔



−−+=
−−+=
 
 
So if ∆=U2-U1 
 ( ) ( )
1 2
1 2 1 2
2 1
1 2 1 2
1
2 2
n n
n
EU EU
p p U a U a
p p
a
= ⇔
− = − − − ⇔
−
= −
∆
 (2.1) 
 
 
Constraints 
i. If 
 
( )
2 1
2 1
1
2 2
2 1
na a
p p
p p a
α
≥ ⇔
−
− ≥ ⇔
∆
≤ − − ∆
 (2.2) 
 
 
 
 
 
D1=0 
D2=1 
then 
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ii. If 
 
( )
2 1
2 1
1
2 2
2 1
na a
p p
a
p p a
≤ ⇔
−
− ≤ ⇔
∆
≥ − − ∆
 (2.3) 
 
 
 
 
 
iii. If 
   
 
( ) ( )1 2 12 1 2 1
na a a
p a p p a
≤ ≤ ⇔
− − ∆ ≤ ≤ − − ∆
 (2.4) 
 
then 
  
 
( )
2 1
1
1
2
2
a p pD
a a a a
− −
= +
− − ∆
 (2.5) 
and 
 
( )
2 1
2
1
2
2
a p pD
a a a a
− −
= −
− − ∆
 (2.6) 
 
 
 
 Downstream monopoly 
 If only firm 1 survives  
 ( )11 2 12 1d a c cπ = − ∆ + −  (2.7) 
and upstream monopolist’s profits are 
 
1
1
d
m cπ =  (2.8) 
 If only firm 2 survives  
D1=1 
D2=0 
then 
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 ( )22 1 21 2d a c cπ = − ∆ + −  (2.9) 
and 
 
2
2
d
m cπ =  (2.10) 
 
 Synoptically 
Dominant 
firm 
π1
di
, π2
di 
(i=1,2) 
πm
di
 
(i=1,2) 
Constraints 
1 ( ) 2 12 1a c c− ∆ + − , 
0 
1c  ( )1 2 1
1
2 2 1 2
3 3
d
a a c cp
 − − ∆ + > +  
2 0, 
( ) 1 21 2a c c− ∆ + −  
2c  ( )2 2 1
2
2 2 1 2
3 3
d
a a c cp
 − + ∆ + > +  
 
 
 Duopoly 
 
 Retailers’ profits 
 The profits for the firm producing the low quality will be 
 ( )
( )
2 1
1 1 1
1
2
2
a p pp c
a a a a
π
 − − = − +
 − − ∆ 
 (2.11) 
  
 Similarly for the firm 2, the one with the high quality 
 ( )
( )
2 1
2 2 2
1
2
2
a p pp c
a a a a
π
 − − = − −
 − − ∆ 
 (2.12) 
 
 Differentiating (2.11) with respect to p1 and (2.12) to p2  
( ) ( )
1
1
2 1 1
0
1 22 0
2 2
p
a p p c
a a a a a a
π∂
= ⇒
∂
− −
+ + = ⇒
− − ∆ − ∆
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2 1
1
1
2 2 2
p cp a = − ∆ + + 
 
 (2.13) 
and 
( ) ( )
2
2
1 2 2
0
1 22 0
2 2
p
a p p c
a a a a a a
π∂
= ⇒
∂
− −
+ + = ⇒
− − ∆ − ∆
 
 
1 2
2
1
2 2 2
p cp a = − ∆ + + 
 
 (2.14) 
 
 If the two reaction functions are solved together 
 
( )
2 1
1
2 2 1 2
3 3
a a c cp
 − − ∆ + = +  (2.15) 
 
 
( )
2 1
2
2 2 1 2
3 3
a a c cp
 − + ∆ + = +  (2.16) 
 
 The above expressions should not be negative which means that 
 
( )
( )
2 1
1
1
1
2 2 1 2 0
3 3
31 1 11 ,
2 2
a a c cp
c
a a k a c
r
 − − ∆ + = + ≥ ⇒
  ≥ + − − ≡  ∆  
 (2.17) 
 
 
( )
( )
2 1
2
1
1
2 2 1 2 0
3 3
31 22 1 ,
2
a a c cp
c
a a y a c
r
 − + ∆ + = + ≥ ⇒
 ≥ − + + ≡ ∆ 
 (2.18) 
  
 Using (2.15) and (2.16) into (2.5) and (2.6) the new D1 and D2 will depend on 
c1, c2, a and a  
 
( )
( )
2 1
1
2 2 1
6
a a c c
D
a a
 − − ∆ + − =
− ∆
 (2.19) 
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( )
( )
1 2
2
2 2 1
6
a a c c
D
a a
 − + ∆ + − =
− ∆
 (2.20) 
  
 A necessary condition for D1>0 to be positive is  
 
( )
( )
( )
2 1
1
2 2 1
0
6
1 1 11
2 2
a a c c
D
a a
a a f a
r
 − − ∆ + − = > ⇒
− ∆
  > + − ≡  
  
 (2.21) 
 
and for D2>0 is  
 
( )
( )
( )
1 2
2
2 2 1
0
6
1 12 1
2
a a c c
D
a a
a a g a
r
 − + ∆ + − = > ⇒
− ∆
 > − + ≡ 
 
 (2.22) 
  
 Finally by replacing (2.19) and (2.20) into (2.11) and (2.12)  retailers’ profits 
will be  
 ( ) 21 12 Dπ α α= −  (2.23) 
 ( ) 22 22 Dπ α α= −  (2.24) 
 
 Manufacturer’s profits 
 
 Supposing there is a manufacturer in the market that provides the inputs to two 
firms. Then his profit will be  
1 1 2 2m c D c Dπ = + ⇔  
( )
( )
( )
( )
2 1 1 2
1 2
2 2 1 2 2 1
6 6m
a a c c a a c c
c c
a a a a
π
   − − ∆ + − − + ∆ + −   = +
− ∆ − ∆
 (2.25) 
  
 Maximizing (2.25) with respect to c1 and c2 the first order conditions that appear 
are 
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( )
( )1 2
2 2 1
6
a a
c c
a a
 − − ∆ = +
− ∆
 (2.26) 
 
( )
( )2 1
2 2 1
6
a a
c c
a a
 − + ∆ = +
− ∆
 (2.27) 
 
 Unfortunately these two relations are mirror images, so it is inevitable a specific 
solution to be found. As a consequence for the identification of c1 and c2 it is 
worthwhile mentioning that there is an extra equation that should not be overlooked. 
There is no reason for the producer to leave any extra surplus even to the indifferent 
consumer, which implies that  
 ( ) 0nEU a =  (2.28) 
 First of all for defining αn as a function of c1 and c2 we should substitute (2.15) 
and (2.16) into (2.1) 
 
( ) 1 25 2
6n
a a c c
a
∆ − + ∆ − +
=
∆
 (2.29) 
 
 If (2.29) and (2.15) is replaced in (2.28), then 
( ) ( )1 2 2 1
2
5 2 2 2 2 0
6 3 3 3
a a c c a a c cU
   ∆ − + ∆ − + −
   − ∆ − ∆ − − =
   ∆
   
 
 
which can be solved with respect to c2  
 2 1 22 2 2c c U α α= − + −∆ − ∆ + ∆  (2.30) 
 
As defined c2>0  
 2 12 2 2U cα α−∆ − ∆ + ∆ >  (2.31) 
  
Solving (2.30) and (2.27) we can get  
 
 1 2
1 1 2( 2 )( 12 6(1 2 2 ) )
12
a a
c U a a
a a
+ −
= − + − + − ∆
−
 (2.32) 
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 2 2
1 1 2(4 12 6(1 2 2 ) )
12
a
c U a a
a a
−
= + + − + − ∆
−
  (2.33) 
 
 There is also a main hypothesis that 2 1c c>  which by using (2.32) and (2.33) 
leads to  
 
1 2 4 0( )
2
a a
a a
a a
+ −
< ⇔
− −
>
   (2.34) 
 
 For known c1 and c2 then  
 
 
2
1 2
2
2
1 ( 1 ( 2 36 30 ) 12
36( )
12 (4 36 30 ))
p U
U
α α
α α
α α
= − + − + − ∆ + ∆ −
−
∆ + − + ∆
 (2.35) 
 
 
2
2 2
2
2
1 ( 1 (2 36 6 ) 12
36( )
12 ( 4 36 6 ))
p U
U
α α
α α
α α
= − + + − ∆ − ∆ +
−
∆ + − − + ∆
 (2.36) 
 
 
2 2
1
1 (1 24 12 (6 4)
36
(2 6(1 6 ) ))
D a α α
α α
= ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − +
− + ∆
  (2.37) 
 
 2
1 (1 2 4 )( 1 6 6 )
36
D α α α α= ∆ + − − + ∆ − ∆   (2.38) 
 
 
2 2
1
2
(1 24 12 ( 4 6 )
648( )
(2 6(1 6 ) ))
π α α α
α α
α α
∆
= + ∆ + ∆ + − + ∆ +
−
− + ∆
 (2.39) 
 
 
2 2
2 (1 2 4 ) (1 6 6 )648( )π α α α αα α
∆
= + − − ∆ + ∆
−
  (2.40) 
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2
2 2
2 3 2
2
( (1 2 4 )
216( )
6( )(1 2 5 2 4
36( ) ) 108(1 2 2 )( ) )
m
U
π α α
α α
α α α α α αα α
α α α α α α
∆
= − + − +
−
− + − − + + +
− ∆ − + − − ∆
 (2.41) 
 
 Further constraints arise such as 1 0p > and 2 0p >  (by using (2.35) and (2.36) ) 
 
 2 24 36 6( )( 5 2 2 ) 1 2 36U Uα α α α α α α α+ + − − + + ∆ > + +  (2.42) 
 2 21 2 36 4 36 6( )(1 2 2 )U Uα α α α α α α α+ + > + + − + + ∆  (2.43) 
 
Combining (2.42) and (2.43) 
 
2
2
2 1
( )(2 ) 0
2
U
U
or
U U
α α− −∆ > ⇔
∆
>
> −
   (2.44) 
 
 
 
 Perfect labels  
 
Efficient 
firm 
r∈[,] p1PL p2PL D1PL D2PL 
1 r∈[0,1] c2- ∆ c2 1 0 
2 r∈[1,+∞] c1 ∆ 0 1 
 
Retailers’ and manufacturer’s profits 
Efficient firm π1PL π2PL πmPL 
1 c2  – c1 - ∆  0 c1 
2 0 ∆ – (c2 – c1) c2 
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 Comparison 
 
 Efficient firm : 1 
  Firm 1    π1 > π1PL 
     π1
d1> π1
PL
 
  Firm 2   π2 > π2d1=π2PL 
  Upstream monopolist  πmd1= πmPL 
 
 Efficient firm : 2 
  Firm 1    π1 > π1d2 = π1PL 
  Firm 2   π2 > π2PL 
     π2
d2
 < π2
PL
 
  Upstream monopolist  πmd1= πmPL 
 
 Moreover it is worthwhile including the comparison in manufacturer’s profits 
between the perfect label and the case of absence of label with dominant firm  
 
2
( 1, 2)
PL
m i
di
m i
m i i
i
c
c i
c D
π
π
π
=
= =
=∑
 
  Perfect label 
  Efficient firm 1 Efficient firm 2 
Dominant firm 1 πmPL = πmd1 πmPL > πmd1 
No label 
Dominant firm 2  πmPL < πmd2 πmPL = πmd2 
 Duopoly ambiguous ambiguous 
 
 The comparison between duopoly and another case cannot reveal which one is 
more profitable since it all depends on  
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
2
2 2
1 1
2
2 2
1 1
1 2 4 1 6 ( )
( )
216( )
1 2 4 1 6 ( )
( )
216( )
d
m m
PL
m m
a a
c a a c
a a
or
a a
c a a c
a a
π π
α α
π π
α α
< ⇔
+ − ∆ − + ∆ −
< − ∆ +
−
> ⇔
+ − ∆ − + ∆ −
> − ∆ +
−
 (2.45) 
  
Simplifying (2.45)  
 
1
2 2 1(( ) 1) 0
6
d
m m iff
a a and a a
π π<
− ∆ − > > +
∆
  (2.46) 
 
The same follows for firm 2 
 
( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )
2
3
3
1 1 2 4 1 2 4 6 1 4 2 0( )
1 1 2 4 1 2 4 6 1 4 2 0( )
d
m m
PL
m m
a a
a a
or
a a
a a
π π
α α α α α α
π π
α α α α α α
> ⇔
+ − + − + + − − ∆ <
− ∆
> ⇔
+ − + − + + − − ∆ <
− ∆
 
      (2.47) 
Simplifying (2.47) 
 ( )( )( )
12
2
1 2 4 6 1 4 2 0
1
2 4
and
a a
α α
α α α α
α
α
> −
+ − + + − − ∆ > ⇔
> −
  (2.48) 
 
 Last but not least it seems quite interesting whether the changes in retailers’ 
profits are orientated in the same direction as the one of upstream monopolist 
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  Perfect label 
  Efficient firm 1 Efficient firm 2 
Dominant firm 1 π1d1 > π1PL  =0 
Dominant firm 2  =0 π2d2 < π2PL  
N
o
 
la
be
l 
Duopoly π1 > π1PL  π2PL  <> π2 
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